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Hong Kong Anti-Terrorism
Ordinance And The Surveillance
Society: Privacy And Free
Expression Implications
This paper is a critical examination of the privacy and free expression
implications of surveillance in the wake of new anti-terrorism law in Hong
Kong. Surveillance has increased worldwide since the recent terrorist
attacks. New technological modes of surveillance have become
indispensable weapons in this ‘war on terrorism’. The extent to which
such surveillance technology impacts on privacy and free expression has
been explored extensively in the literature both in Europe and North
America. The issue, however, has received little attention in Asia.
European and North American anti-terrorism laws are set within the
framework of legislative safeguards – safeguards as to the permissible
boundaries of State surveillance. Where anti-terrorism laws impede civil
liberties, the legislation is relatively clear and transparent. The situation
in Hong Kong may be differentiated with that in Europe and North
America; there do not appear to be any legal safeguards in place to curtail
surveillance, while the notion of transparency seems wholly lacking in
the larger legal framework of surveillance.
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he reverberations of September 11 and the recent attacks in
Bali have been felt worldwide. These attacks elicited quick
responses from legislative assemblies from around the world,
including Hong Kong’s. The legislative responses to terrorism
have provoked challenges to democracy: to our views of civil
liberties, to our legal systems, and to our conception of security.
The new Hong Kong anti-terrorism measures, while not as
robust and intrusive from a civil liberties perspective as their North
American and European counterparts, nonetheless have privacy
and free expression implications. Prior to the enactment of the
anti-terrorism measures in Hong Kong, the government had asked
interested members of the community to submit any questions or
comments pertaining to the draft provisions. Many submissions
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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to the Security Bureau highlight potential free expression problems:
journalists’ being forced to hand over confidential source materials;
the broad wording of the definition of terrorism; the unrestricted
ability to delegate authority; and the malleability of future
governments bending to the influence of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) (BBC News, 2002). My primary concern, however, is
not with the particular wording of specific provisions but rather with
the aggregate of data collection and information used to obtain
evidence against suspect terrorists and terrorist acts.
The aggregate of methods of data collection and information is
a less politically charged way of saying surveillance. Surveillance
often conjures images of the literary depictions of police-state
societies in the works of Orwell, Kafka and Huxley when, in fact,
surveillance is essentially about the collection of data and
information. For this reason, surveillance will often be referred to
in Hong Kong legislation as the “interception of communications”
(legal perspective) or “data collection” (more neutral and corporate
in perspective). Surveillance is either targeted at a particular person
or organisation (personal surveillance) or it is used as a mass tool to
identify certain patterns (dataveillance).
It is important to recognise that surveillance is neither inherently
evil nor undesirable. It should be understood in the context in which
it is applied and, more importantly, for the actual use made of the
data once collected. Thus it may be the case that searching for
communications which contain signals for bombs may be desirable,
but using the same data for other unrelated purposes such as
evidence in a minor crime of shoplifting may be wholly undesirable.
Society must decide under what context it is appropriate to use
surveillance techniques and, more importantly, what safeguards are
necessary for the type of surveillance utilised. By safeguards I am
referring primarily to legal safeguards such as legislation which
targets and limits the use of surveillance. Technological safeguards
(e.g. security mechanisms on Internet) and democratic safeguards
(e.g. rule of law) are outside the scope of this paper. However, the
legal safeguards that I will refer to are inevitably linked to notions
of technological and democratic safeguards.
How does an individual or corporation become a suspect of
terrorism or linked to an act of terrorism (this would include threats
of violent action as well as more passive acts such as facilitating
property acquisition for such groups)? Through a massive and
indeed global collection of data and information. Conventional
methods include wiretapping, searching premises, and using ‘spies’.
The reality, however, is that this data collection will increasingly be
done through sophisticated and often undetectable technologies:
web-sniffers such as Carnivore, satellite systems such as Echelon,
remote surveillance software such as Magic Lantern, nano spy
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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technology, biometrics technology, face and voice recognition
systems, Smart ID cards, and by requiring Internet Service
Providers (ISP) to become deputised spies.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I will analyse
the privacy and free expression implications of surveillance. This
will be achieved by looking at the concepts of surveillance and
dataveillance and through a description and overview of some of
the more prominent surveillance technologies. Secondly, I will
suggest what types of safeguards should be required in the Hong
Kong Anti-Terrorism Ordinance (and other related legislation) to
ensure that civil liberties are not unnecessarily impaired. The Hong
Kong Anti-Terrorism Ordinance is silent on matters of surveillance,
unlike legislation in other jurisdictions such as Canada and the
United States, which expressly outline measures relating to
surveillance.

Surveillance
And
Dataveillance

28

The Concept Revealed
Surveillance has traditionally been associated with notions
of physicality. So, for example, a prison guard would monitor
prisoners, or a security guard would shadow suspicious
consumers in a store, or a police agent may follow a suspect of
crime. Increasingly, however, such surveillance is being done
through physical enhancements such as cameras, audio
equipment, and sophisticated technologies. Surveillance as a
generic concept is described by Roger Clarke as:
“Surveillance is the systematic investigation or monitoring
of the actions or communications of one or more persons. Its
primary purpose is generally to collect information about him/
her, their activities, or their associates” (Clarke, 1988: 499).
Surveillance has traditionally been understood as targeting a
person for a specified reason. Dataveillance, on the other hand, is
not targeted at surveilling a specific person; Clarke defines
dataveillance as, “the systematic use of personal data systems in
the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications
of one or more persons.” Dataveillance is a way of saying mass
surveillance. It is “concerned with groups of people and involves
a generalised suspicion that some (as yet unidentified) members
of the group may be of interest” (Clarke, 1988: 499). The purpose
of dataveillance is often to identify certain persons within a group
who would later become the target of surveillance at a personal
level.
Technologies operate under a similar premise. Surveillance
technologies target a specific person who is suspected of exhibiting
certain defined characteristics. Dataveillance technologies are a
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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mass tool in that they are directed at the public en masse for the
purpose of singling out those individuals with the set of sought
attributes. Dataveillance also has an important differentiating
function from surveillance – as it is significantly less expensive,
the economic constraints found in traditional surveillance methods
are greatly diminished, thereby providing further incentive to use
such dataveillance methods. The following is an analysis of both
surveillance and dataveillance technologies, and their potential
implications for privacy and free expression.

Technology has become a powerful and silent partner in the
war on terrorism. Without doubt, surveillance has increased
worldwide because of 11 September 2001. What remains doubtful
is whether unanticipated types of surveillance will continue to
proliferate for reasons purely associated with and restricted to
terrorism. This begs the question of what types of surveillance are
appropriate in a free and democratic society and what safeguards
are necessary for the different surveillance methods.
It is not my aim to provide a comprehensive overview of
surveillance and dataveillance technologies – such a task would
be overwhelming due to the speed with which such technologies
change. Rather, my aim is to provide sufficient technological detail
to allow for a more robust understanding of the privacy and free
expression implications of the use of innovative technology. The
focus of discussion will emphasise the technologies that are most
applicable to Hong Kong (either those already in use or those which
pose a high risk for abuse) and will briefly outline emerging
surveillance technologies.

The Silent
Technologies

Carnivore / Web-sniffers
Developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Carnivore is a remote controlled web-sniffer technology. Just as
dogs are used in airports to sniff through luggage in search of
narcotics, web-sniffers are programmed to identify and locate
specified types of information on the Internet. The software will
be programmed to locate and track usage of key phrases and words
through Internet communications. It cannot, however, decipher
encrypted text. The technology is connected to an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) network, and is designed to intercept data
transmitted over the Internet in order to aid authorities in criminal
investigation (Electronic Privacy Information Center). In the era
of terrorism, Carnivore is readily used to track the electronic
communications of terrorists.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002

29

ALANA MAURUSHAT: Hong Kong anti-terrorism...

America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the USA Patriot Act), Carnivore
could only be used in the United States (US) when it was targeted
at a specific individual under the direction of a court order
followed by a court review of the information gathered. In this
sense Carnivore resembles a personal surveillance technology.
The system was designed for specific and focused searches.
However, its original design has been improved so that it is also
capable of mass surveillance. This concept is called packet sniffing.
Such use allows the technology to search emails for key words
such as ‘bomb’. Thus the only thing limiting Carnivore to a
personal surveillance is in fact the court order specifying its
parameter of operation. The type of court order and standard of
proof varies in the US depending on the nationality of the
suspected terrorist or criminal, those subject to domestic law
enforcement and those subject to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). Surveillance of those persons subject to
domestic law enforcement, namely US citizens and permanent
residents, requires a court order specifying the scope of the
surveillance and the government must still prove probable cause.
For those individuals who are not a US citizen or permanent
resident, FISA applies allowing for a secret court to authorise US
intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance without proving
probable cause.
Additionally, under FISA, Carnivore surveillance may
commence without a court order, authorities then have up to a
year to obtain the required court order. For both domestic and
FISA surveillance, court ordered specific targeting remains a
requirement (either through the domestic or secret court),
however, there is no longer any requirement for the court to review
the information to ascertain whether it complies with the original
scope of the court order. In effect, government agencies may now
rove from communication portal to communication portal with
significantly less restraints as to what and whom they are searching
for (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2002).
On a final note, web-sniffing technology is deployed in many
nations other than the US, most noticeably in China. Web-sniffing
technologies currently require cooperation of ISPs in order to
implement the software. It may be one thing where a court order
requires a private ISP entity to install Government surveillance
technologies (e.g. Carnivore), and yet quite another when an ISP
is owned and controlled by the State, and installs its own (nonGovernment) surveillance technology which would allow it to
circumvent any legislative provisions restricting Governmental
surveillance. As it stands, Carnivore is limited to personal
surveillance but has the technological capability of being used
30
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for mass surveillance. Similar web-sniffer technologies used in other
countries, where they are not legislatively confined to personal
surveillance, are capable of mass surveillance.

Magic Lantern: PC Surveillance Software
Like Carnivore, Magic Lantern is a remote-controlled Internet
software. Where Carnivore is installed on the ISP’s information
system, Magic Lantern is a combination computer worm/Trojan
horse. A worm or a Trojan horse is similar to a computer virus
inasmuch as the effects are an unwanted intrusion into the ‘private’
sphere of one’s computer or computer network. Worms or Trojan
horses, however, differ from a virus in that they “propagate
themselves from system to system without the use of an infected
file or diskette [and] exist inside of other files and documents that
are sent as attachments with the initial message” (http://www.systech.net/support/virus_info/definition).
Magic Lantern is a software that installs itself on the target
computer and allows for keystroke capturing or keystroke logging,
enabling others to read your messages as you type. It was developed
to allow the FBI to crack the encryption that is used by terrorists
and other criminals (Electronic Privacy Information Center). Such
keystroke detection technology is useful to decipher encrypted
messages.
Unlike Carnivore, Magic Lantern is strictly a personal
surveillance technology – it does not have the potential to be used
as a mass surveillance tool. As a result, Magic Lantern is much more
analogous to a phone tap than Carnivore. This tool is used to target
an individual already suspected of wrongdoing and would be
somewhat futile when applied randomly or en masse. Keystroke/
web-sniffer technology in the wake of terrorist attacks is increasingly
being used in remote control cross-border internet searches where
one nation uses a ‘sniffer’ keystroke recording program to enter
into computer systems of individuals resident in another nation
often performed without the cooperation of enforcement officials
in the targeted nation (Goldsmith, 2001). As such, government
agencies are able to read any messages or searches typed in on your
computer as well as ‘sniff’ for specific phrases, and names linked to
terrorism.

Echelon / Satellite Surveillance
Gathering information about Echelon is a difficult process as,
according to US authorities, it does not exist. Let us, for the moment,
assume that it does exist and afford credibility to those reports which
claim its existence.
Echelon has been described as a net. It is reportedly a complex
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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web of radio antennae at listening stations across the planet to
intercept satellite communications (see Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Echelonwatch). British analyst Duncan
Campbell (2000) prepared a comprehensive detailed report on
Echelon for the European Parliament explaining the interception
of communications ability of Echelon.
The surveillance capability of this technology, from the
evidence adduced in this report, appears to be all-pervasive.
According to the Echelonwatch group (2002):
Echelon is perhaps the most powerful intelligence gathering
organization in the world. Several credible reports suggest that
this global electronic communications surveillance system
presents an extreme threat to the privacy of people all over the
world. According to these reports, Echelon attempts to capture
staggering volumes of satellite, microwave, cellular, and fiberoptic traffic, including communications to and from North
America. This vast quantity of voice and data communications
are then processed through sophisticated filtering technologies.
This type of technology certainly brings to mind the image
of an Orwellian surveillance. The effectiveness of ‘Big Brother’ to
meaningfully filter this data remains far from perfect, and turning
raw data into intelligence remains difficult. As Echelon does not
‘officially’ exist according to US authorities, no legal safeguards
operate to limit its surveillance use nor do the provisions in the
Patriot Act apply to this ‘non-existent’ technology.

Biometrics Technology
Biometrics technology consists of breaking down a person’s
body part, whether it be a face, retina or fingerprint, into digital
components much like a compact disc records music in digital
format as opposed to analogue (the first breaks the music wave
into thousands of stops and starts undetectable to the ear while
the latter records the actual waves generated by the music
preserving the continuity). The digital components are broken
down into such detail and then they are numbered and charted.
Comparisons of the numbered chart pattern may then be
compared with information in a database.
Digital face technology (captured by cameras) is already used
in airports and in heavily trafficked areas in some public city
spaces. The 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida used this
technology to scan the faces of the football game attendees and
then compared the images in a database of faces for the purpose
of identifying potential terrorists and criminals. Similarly, closedcircuit camera monitors with digital face recognition technology
32
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have been installed in the Lan Kwai Fong area of Hong Kong. Such
technology is aligned with mass surveillance in that data is collected
en masse and where certain sought attributes are identified, the
surveillance is then targeted at specific individuals.

Smart ID Cards
In Hong Kong, The Registration of Persons (Amendment) Bill
will introduce and indeed mandate multi-application Smart Identity
Card technology. A simplistic way of describing this technology is
that it is a multi-function credit card sized ‘plastic’ card containing
an integrated chip (Alder, 2002). One card will perform the functions
that are currently performed by several cards. The current proposal
is limited to four applications: National ID card, Driver’s License,
and Library card as well as what is called the Postal E-Certification
function. Additionally, the Smart ID Card will utilise biometrics
technology where a person’s fingerprint will be digitally stored on
the Card for identification purposes. New applications may be
added to the card in the future.
The four applications of the Smart ID Card consist of four
separate functions where the data contained in each section is
segregated. The other essential component of Smart ID Cards is
the reader of the card. The reader refers to the authorised technical
device which reads the information on the card. The actual card,
therefore, stores the data while the reader tracks it.
The collection of data in and of itself should not necessarily be
construed negatively nor does it give rise to grave concerns. Smart
ID Cards allow for more gathering of personal data for the
construction of data profiles. It is potentially dangerous because
the data collected is attributable to an individual, therefore allowing
for personal monitoring and tracking in an unprecedented manner.
The last point to be made is that technological safeguards require
legal safeguards which restrain unwarranted and potentially
abusive uses of the data gathered by these cards. This last point
requires some elaboration.
Much of the debate on Smart ID Cards has been situated on
the risk of technological interference with the data contained on
the card. In other words, the risk is perceived as a technological
one. In a submission to Legco on the proposed bill Professor KwokYan Lam (2002) comments:
The MULTOS card operating system, which is adopted as the
card platform of the smart ID card, provides built-in security
mechanisms to segregate multiple applications resident on the chip
of the smart card. It also provides mechanisms for securely loading
and deleting applications to/from the chip at the post-issuance stage
of the card. These security features ensure that the smart ID card
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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may support multiple applications without worrying about
interference among on-card applications (interference refers to the
situation that one on-card application accesses data belonging to
another on-card application). Furthermore, future loading and
deleting of on-card applications can only be conducted by parties
authorised by the SMARTICS system.
The argument made is that the card has stringent access
control mechanisms and utilises a number of security techniques
to safeguard the integrity of the data contained on the card.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the risk assessment on the
security of the card, the important point to be made is that
technological safeguards must be accompanied by a robust set of
legislative controls and limits to the use of such data. While there
may be a segregation of physical data and access to such data, the
segregation of the use of the data is critical. Thus a key criticism
of Smart ID cards is the potentially unfettered cross use by coissuers such as separate branches of the Hong Kong Government.

Other Types of Spy-Ware Technology
There is a growing list of innovative spy-ware being
developed for surveillance. The following is a sample of some of
these technologies: wave detectors, optic taps, window bouncers,
nanotechnology, power surveillance, microchip implants, radiation
analysis, and remote-controlled dust mites (Branigan, 2002). A
detailed analysis will not be provided of such technologies as they
are currently not in widespread use for surveillance or other
purposes. On the less ‘James Bond’ side of things, traditional wiretape on telephones, and Internet services are not to be forgotten.

Privacy And
Free
Expression
Implications Of
Surveillance

34

As Charles Sykes once wrote, “Privacy is like oxygen. We
really only appreciate it when it’s gone” (Sykes, 1999). From my
perspective, it would be equally appropriate to put freedom of
expression in the same category as privacy, that is, as an underappreciated liberty.
What is privacy? Is it a positive or negative right or is this
characterisation more accurately portrayed as a convention that
society has become accustomed to expect? As Simon Davies (2002)
explains:
“Privacy is perhaps the most unruly and controversial of all
human rights. Its definition varies widely according to context
and environment to the extent that even after decades of academic
interest in the subject, the world’s leading experts have been unable
to agree on a single definition... And, like the concept of freedom,
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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privacy means different things to different cultures. In France, it
equates most closely to liberty. In America, it is an inseparable
component of individual freedoms – particularly freedom from
intrusion by federal government. Many European countries
interpret privacy as the protection of personal data. Since the days
of the huge campaign against the government’s proposed ID card
in 1987, most Australians view privacy as a measure of state power,
while the government views it as a set of strictly defined legal
rights.”
Set against a background of competing definitions, it is difficult
to ascertain what privacy means to citizens of Hong Kong. Perhaps
the better question to ask is, in an era of extensive surveillance,
what are citizens’ expectations of privacy? When one makes a phone
call on a mobile phone, or when one sends an email to a friend, or
when one uses one’s Octopus card (a small, plastic smart card
without ID function) to purchase coffee at Starbucks, is there an
expectation that these communications are privately communicated
or do we expect such communications to be public in the sense that
we are being watched and listened to.
Lisa Austin (2002) addresses the notion of the expectation of
privacy noting, “The constitutional cousin of ‘If you aren’t doing
anything wrong then what do you have to hide?’ is ‘What did you
expect?’ If we expect surveillance, then … it is difficult to argue
that this expected surveillance nonetheless violates our privacy.” I
would argue that this is an insufficient test to ascertain if privacy
has been violated. If privacy is aligned with a human right then it
should matter very little if the expectation is one of surveillance,
the significance of the right remains unchanged. This pivotal point
of whether an individual expects to have private as opposed to
surveilled communication is one of behaviour alteration. If we do
not expect privacy, we alter our behaviour and our discourse to
reflect our environment. We engage in self-censorship under the
pretext that our communications are not private. “The paranoia
and fear of being monitored is as much a tool of censorship as the
reality of the monitoring itself” (Liu & Wiggins, 2002). This presents
the important question – what is the impact, in turn, on freedom of
expression?
The right to freedom of speech may exist, but if the practice of
surveillance becomes all-pervasive, there may not be rights after
such words are freely spoken (Gan, 2002). Consider the following
example: The Constitution for the People’s Republic of China
recognises “freedom of speech.” This freedom of speech is rooted
in the ideal of communal sharing of ideas and as an instrument to
realise state objectives (Reed, 2000: 459). The limited scope of free
expression is pitted against the omniscient prevalence of censorship,
control and surveillance. If you want to send an email to someone
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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expressing your sentiments on the latest appointments to the
leadership of China, ask yourself if you would deliberately alter
or more carefully select your words when sending email from
China as opposed to from Australia or Hong Kong? Your answer
would likely be yes. Why? Because you expect your
communications to be monitored in China. This geographic
distinction of linguistic and ideological borders is, however,
becoming less relevant in the wake of new surveillance technology.
The technology exists to allow governments and corporate
identities to monitor communications via innovative software such
as web-sniffers, packet sniffers, and remote control computer
monitoring software. Thus there are increasingly fewer
technological impediments to surveillance. The impediments are
no longer the limits of technology – it has no limits. The crucial
factor will be legislative control of surveillance. Let us turn to
surveillance legislation.

Legislation
Affecting
Surveillance

Fully ‘unpacking’ surveillance legislation in Hong Kong
requires the dissection of a number of domestic Ordinances as
well as legislation from other jurisdictions. For the purpose of
this paper, I will limit my comments to the anti-terrorism measures
and interception of communications measures in Hong Kong as
well as highlight some international standards as they relate to
surveillance.

United Nations (Anti-Terrorism) Ordinance
The United Nations (Anti-Terrorism) Ordinance was enacted
in Hong Kong in order to fulfill China’s obligations to the United
Nations Security Council resolution against terrorism. The
Ordinance is predominantly tailored to curtail the financing of
terrorists.
a) Defining Terrorists and Terrorist Property
Section 4 of the Ordinance defines terrorists, terrorist
associates and terrorist properties as those designated by a United
Nations (UN) Committee. The UN Committee publishes a list of
terrorists, terrorist associates and terrorist property (the list is
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001/
fal85j_01.html). Due to the sensitive and important nature of this
information (an assumption on my part), the process is highly
secretive. The data collection and information sharing, and the
use of such data to determine the list of entities appearing on such
lists is shrouded. Additionally, once an entity finds itself on this
list, the procedure to remove itself remains equally unknown. It
36
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is fair to say, however, that the information collected on such entities
is done through both domestic and international surveillance of
suspect individuals and groups, and that such information is shared
between federal security bureaus in the international arena. It is
furthermore fair to say that such surveillance inevitably utilises
various forms of surveillance technology.
b) Obtaining of Evidence and Information
Once an entity is listed on the UN Committee designated list of
terrorists, the collection of additional evidence and information will
be required. Section 19 (Regulations) of the Ordinance sets out the
power of the Government to obtain evidence and information:
Section 19 Obtaining Evidence and Information
(2) The Secretary may make regulations for the purposes
of
(a) facilitating the obtaining of evidence in relation to the
commission of an offence under this Ordinance
(b) facilitating the obtaining of evidence in relation to the
commission of an offence under the Ordinance
(3) The Secretary may make regulations for the purposes
of authorizing public officers to perform functions or
exercise powers under regulations made under this
section.
This wording of these provisions is broad and grants virtually
unrestricted powers to the Secretary to make regulations pertaining
to the obtaining of evidence and information, which would include
surveillance methods.
So far, the Security Bureau has yet to make regulations in this
regard. It remains unclear whether such regulations would
supplement or trump existing legislation relating to surveillance.
Upon further investigation, we will see that the question of whether
the characterisation is one of supplementation or replacement is
somewhat misleading as the Interception of Communications
Ordinance has not entered into force.

Interception of Communications Ordinance
The Interception of Communications Ordinance is a most
peculiar piece of legislation. It was a private member’s bill enacted
in June 1997, but some five years later has yet to enter into force.
This piece of legislation was pushed through prior to the handover
in 1997 out of a desire to restrict and prevent potentially abusive
monitoring practices. Many concerns lingered after the bill was
enacted. The Security Bureau represented that it would undertake
to write a Consultation Paper on the matter. To date, this paper has
not yet been written.
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002

37

ALANA MAURUSHAT: Hong Kong anti-terrorism...

It is unfortunate that this Ordinance or a similar type of
legislation has not become law and, as evidenced by the reluctance
of the Security Bureau to move forward on the matter, looks as
though it is not likely to become law any time soon. Further
investigation reveals that this Ordinance contains many safeguards
against unwarranted and abusive practices of surveillance. The
following sections are examples of such safeguards:
Section 4 Authorization for Interception
(2) An order shall not be made under this section unless
it is necessary
(a) for the purpose of preventing or detecting a serious
crime, or
(b) in the interest of the security of Hong Kong
(3) In deciding whether it is necessary to make an order,
the judge shall determine that
(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that an
offence is being committed, has been committed, or
is about to be committed;
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that
information concerning the offence referred to in
paragraph (a) will be obtained through the
interception sought
(c) all other methods of investigation have been tried
and have failed, or are unlikely to succeed; and
(d) there is good reason to believe that the interception
sought will result in a conviction.

Other
Legislation

38

Section 11 Power to Obtain Information
The Legislative Council may at any time require the Secretary
for Security to provide, for any specified period, the following
information, namely –
(a) the number of interceptions authorized and denied;
(b) the nature and location of the facilities from which
and the place where the communications have been
intercepted;
(c) the major offences for which interception has been
used as an investigatory method;
(d) the types of interception methods used;
(e) the number of persons arrested and convicted as a
result of interceptions;
(f) the average duration of each interception; and
(g) the number of renewals sought and denied.
These provisions are a sample of the types of legal safeguards
appropriate to the utilisation of personal surveillance methods.
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There are additional legislative measures that impact on
surveillance: Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Postal Ordinance
and Telecommunications Ordinance. Without addressing the merit
and substantive elements of these ordinances, the point to be gleaned
from the analysis of multiple legislative measures is that the impact
on civil liberties cannot be derived from the study of one particular
piece of legislation; these legislative measures must be studied as a
collective package both in terms of their interaction and the collective
effects on safeguarding privacy and freedom of expression.

In order to effectively implement appropriate safeguards
relating to surveillance, three points must be addressed. The starting
point for this discussion is first to identify what types of surveillance
are consistent with the values of a free and democratic society. A
second point is that data collection may have ancillary effects.
Information collected for one purpose will often become used in
the context of some secondary purpose that is not necessarily known
or understood at the time of its collection, otherwise known as data
creep. And finally, silence does not necessarily mean compliance.
The Hong Kong Anti-Terrorism Ordinance is relatively silent with
respect to surveillance which begs the question of whether nontransparency (whether or not it is unintentional) raises further
questions of privacy and free expression.

Surveillance
Requires
Safeguards

What types of surveillance are consistent with the
values of Hong Kong society?
Privacy and freedom of expression are fundamental
underpinnings for a free and democratic society, and are recognised
rights in Hong Kong. Surveillance is often justified by the need to
protect national security. To the extent that such techniques are used
to protect real ‘national security’ interests as opposed to ‘regime’
interests is a potential problem. In this sense, legal safeguards are
required to ensure that surveillance is conducted in a transparent
manner. Surveillance and transparency appear to conjure opposing
values, the one of secrecy and the other of openness. These values,
however, are not necessarily in competition with one another.
Surveillance may be done secretly (arguably it is most effective when
undetected) if the procedure to obtain permission to do so is
transparent. Clarification in the Anti-Terrorism Ordinance is
required to restrict the methods used to obtain evidence and
information and to articulate in what context such surveillance
methods should be used.
It may further be the case that certain types of surveillance
should perhaps be barred from use. By its very nature, mass
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dataveillance is difficult to impose restrictions on. How, for
example, does one obtain a court order to scrutinise every citizen’s
email within domestic borders? And within the international
scene?

Ancillary effects of data collection and data creep
Consider the following scenario: The United States Patriot
Act allows investigators to obtain orders compelling booksellers
or librarians to turn over private information about their customers
and patrons. A bookseller could be ordered to turn over a list of
the books a customer has purchased and a librarian can be
compelled to report what books a patron has borrowed. This raises
privacy and free speech implications concerning such searches.
The same information, however, could potentially be collected
about a library patron through Smart ID Card technology. The
technology is seen as a way to provide benefits and convenience
to both the citizens and Government of Hong Kong. Instead of
carrying multiple cards around, the Smart ID card combines
multiple uses so that a person need only carry one card. Although
the information collected on the Smart ID Card does not have as
its purpose the ability to monitor what books a person takes out
from the library, this is a potential secondary effect of its
application. The data collected ‘creeps’ from one use to another,
thus the term ‘data creep.’

Silence is not compliance
The United States Patriot Act gives broad powers of
investigation and surveillance to its authorities. The Patriot Act
clearly states that it overrides other legislation including those
relating to privacy and restrictions on surveillance techniques. As
one reads this Act, it is obvious that civil liberties are being
compromised. However, when one reads the Anti-Terrorism
Ordinance it would appear that, on its face, civil liberties are
substantially less threatened. However, as I have demonstrated,
non-transparency poses significant problems for potential abuses.
And for that matter, the danger is that such abuses could go on
undetected. The potential for abusive practice is further
augmented by virtue of the lack of a prior framework restricting
surveillance.
In this respect, it is imperative that the Government of Hong
Kong either enact new legislation relating to the interception of
communications or put into operation the Interception of
Communications Ordinance.
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Dataveillance and mass tools of surveillance
Dataveillance or technologies which allow mass surveillance
are likely to be outside the control of Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council. Without arriving at any conclusion on this point, it is
relatively safe to speculate that data is currently being collected
using technologies of mass surveillance. The uses of such
technologies are also not confined to domestic borders; they are
global in their reach. Information collected from beyond domestic
borders is prolific and may require an international agreement at
some point in the future.

Conclusion
All legislation related to surveillance should clearly delineate
what types of surveillance techniques are appropriate and under
what conditions, as well as what safeguards they should be
subjected to.
Surveillance legislation is fundamental to safeguarding privacy
and free expression. As such, it is important to establish boundaries
to the scope of data collection for present and future governments
as well as for private entities.
Establishing adequate legislative safeguards for surveillance
will make this type of legislation less malleable for future
governments bending to the influence of the PRC. This is
particularly important given the contentious nature of the debate
on Article 23 of the Basic Law (sedition, state secrets and subversion).
Civil liberties help to define a culture and its society. The
gathering of private information dossiers on individuals has been
heralded as “the badge of the totalitarian state” (Sir Nicholas
Browne-Wilkinson, quoted in Norton-Taylor, 2002). If democratic
values are to remain important in Hong Kong, then civil liberties
must be championed.
Do members of society expect privacy in their communications
or is the expectation one of being watched? This query may be
extended one step further. Perhaps the expectation is a mixture of
both elements. Under certain circumstances you expect your
communications to be monitored while in other situations you
expect privacy. When you speak on your cellular phone in public,
you knowingly forfeit your right to a private conversation. In the
comfort of your own home, however, you would expect your
conversation to be confined to a more private space. Legal
safeguards operate on a similar premise. The State may only use
surveillance methods when a person is a suspect in a crime or
terrorist act, and when these methods are defined and confined to
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their enabling legislation. In the absence of such legislation,
however, it may be the case that privacy is more of an empty
concept than a reality. If privacy has indeed ceased to exist, the
malignant effect of such legislative short-sightedness is that free
expression may descend the same slippery slope.
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